No disponible en español
Alessandro Beber
- 16 January 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 64Details
- Abstract
- In both the subprime crisis and the eurozone crisis, regulators imposed bans on short sales, aimed mainly at preventing stock price turbulence from destabilizing financial institutions. Contrary to the regulators’ intentions, financial institutions whose stocks were banned experienced greater increases in the probability of default and volatility than unbanned ones, and these increases were larger for more vulnerable financial institutions. To take into account the endogeneity of short sales bans, we match banned financial institutions with unbanned ones of similar size and riskiness, and instrument the 2011 ban decisions with regulators’ propensity to impose a ban in the 2008 crisis.
- JEL Code
- G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation