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Thomas Rønde

4 March 2004
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 316
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Abstract
This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication between the supervisors is modeled as a 'cheap talk' game. We show that: (1) unless the interests of the countries are perfectly aligned, Þrst best closure regulation cannot be implemented; (2) the more aligned the interests are, the higher is welfare; (3) the bank can allocate its investments strategically across countries to escape closure.
JEL Code
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
L51 : Industrial Organization→Regulation and Industrial Policy→Economics of Regulation
1 June 2000
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 22
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Abstract
This paper studies access regulation to international large-value payment systems when banking supervision is national task. We focus on the choice between net settlement or imposing real time gross settlement. As a novel feature, the communication between the supervisors is endogenized. It is shown that the national supervisors' preferences regarding the settlement method are not perfectly aligned. As a result, systemic risk is excessive under public regulation. Still, leaving access regulation to the private banks can only be optimal if they have superior information about the risk of their foreign counter-party in the settlement system.
JEL Code
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

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