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Stefan Gebauer

Monetary Policy

Division

Monetary Policy Strategy

Current Position

Senior Economist

Fields of interest

Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Financial Economics,International Economics

Email

stefan.gebauer@ecb.europa.eu

Education
2014-2020

PhD in Economics, Free University, Berlin, Germany

2012-2014

MSc in International Economics and Economic Policy, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

2008-2012

BSc in Economics and Business Administration, Eberhard Karls University, Tuebingen, Germany

2010-2011

BSc in Economics, University of Massachusetts, Boston, United States

Professional experience
2020-2022

Economist - Macroeconomic Analysis and Forecasting Division, Directorate General Economics, Statistics and International, Banque de France

2016-2020

Research Associate - Forecasting and Economic Policy Department, German Institute for Economic Research (DIW)

2015-2016

External Consultant - Country Surveillance Division, Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank

2013-2014

Research Assistant - Chair of Finance and Economics (Prof. Roman Inderst), Goethe University

2014

Research Intern - Department for Banking and Financial Supervision, Bundesbank

2012-2013

Research Assistant - Economics Department, KfW Banking Group

1 October 2024
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2985
Details
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of rising interest rates on central bank profitability. Using a stylized income model, we demonstrate that changes in interest rates in combination with expansive balance sheet policies introduce a cyclical component into the central bank’s profit and loss statement. Ourfindings reveal, however, that while the interplay of such policies may dampen short-term profitability if interest rates rise, they do not undermine a central bank’s financial strength, because higher interest rates also raise the value of future seigniorage income. Using data for the euro area, we quantify the consequences for inflation of setting interest rates aimed at mitigating financial losses, showing that such a strategy would lead to substantially higher inflation rates. Overall, our findings confirm that a central bank’s willingness to accept temporary losses reflects a commitment to price stability, rather than a hindrance.
JEL Code
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
31 July 2024
THE ECB BLOG
Details
JEL Code
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E59 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Other
13 May 2020
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2406
Details
Abstract
Macroprudential policies are often aimed at the commercial banking sector, while a host of other non-bank financial institutions, or shadow banks, may not fall under their jurisdiction. We study the effects of tightening commercial bank regulation on the shadow banking sector. We develop a DSGE model that differentiates between regulated, monopolistic competitive commercial banks and a shadow banking system that relies on funding in a perfectly competitive market for investments. After estimating the model using euro area data from 1999 – 2014 including information on shadow banks, we find that tighter capital requirements on commercial banks increase shadow bank lending, which may have adverse financial stability effects. Coordinating macroprudential tightening with monetary easing can limit this leakage mechanism, while still bringing about the desired reduction in aggregate lending. In a counterfactual analysis, we compare how macroprudential policy implemented before the crisis would have dampened the business and lending cycles.
JEL Code
E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
Network
Research Task Force (RTF)
12 September 2017
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2101
Details
Abstract
This paper investigates the link between corporate debt and investment for a group of fi ve peripheral euro area countries. Using firm-level data from 2005-2014, we postulate a non-linear corporate leverage-investment relationship and derive thresholds beyond which leverage has a negative and signi ficant impact on investment. The investment sensitivity of debt increased after 2008 when financial distress intensifi ed and fi rms had a lower capacity to finance investment from internal sources of funds. Our results also suggest that even moderate levels of debt can exert a negative influence on investment for smaller firms or when pro fitability is low.
JEL Code
E22 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy→Capital, Investment, Capacity
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
G31 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Capital Budgeting, Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies, Capacity
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
2023
European Economic Review
  • Gebauer, S. and Mazelis, F.
2022
Banque de France Working Paper Series
  • Dees, S., Gebauer, S., Goncalves, T. and Thubin, C.
2022
Banque de France Eco Notepad
  • Gebauer, S.
2021
Banque de France Working Paper Series
  • Gebauer, S.
2021
Banque de France Eco Notepad
  • Gebauer, S., Ouvrard, J.-F. and Thubin, C.
2020
DIW Economic Bulletin
  • Bernoth, K., Clemens, M., Dany-Knedlik, G., and Gebauer, S.
2020
DIW Economic Bulletin
  • Clemens, M., Gebauer, S. and König, T.
2020
DIW Politikberatung Kompakt 158
  • Belitz, H., Clemens, M., Gebauer, S., Michelsen, C.
2020
DIW Aktuell
  • Dany-Knedlik, G., Gebauer, S. and Schlaak, T.
2020
DIW Discussion Papers
  • Clemens, M. , Gebauer, S. and König, T.
2019
DIW Economic Bulletin
  • Gebauer, S., Kritikos, A.S., Kriwoluzky, A., Mattes, A., and Rieth, M.
2019
DIW Economic Bulletin
  • Gebauer, S.
2019
DIW Aktuell
  • Dany-Knedlik, G., Gebauer, S. and Schlaak, T.
2019
IWH Online
  • Brautzsch, H.-U., Dany-Knedlik, G., Drygalla, A., Gebauer, S., Holtemöller, O., Kämpfe, M., Lindner, A., Michelsen, C., Rieth, M. and Schlaak, T.
2018
Journal of International Money and Finance
  • Gebauer, S., Setzer, R. and Westphal, A.
2018
DIW Economic Bulletin
  • Gebauer, S.
2018
DIW Economic Bulletin
  • Gebauer, S.
2017
European Parliament Monetary Dialogue
Monetary policy implications of financial innovation: In-depth analysis
  • Bernoth, K., Gebauer, S. and Schäfer, D.
2017
DIW Roundup
  • Gebauer, S.
2017
DIW Economic Bulletin
  • Albig, H,. Clemens, M., Fichtner, F., Gebauer, S., Junker, S. and Kholodilin, K.
2017
DIW Economic Bulletin
  • Clemens, M., Gebauer, S. and Rieth, M.