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Níl an t-ábhar seo ar fáil i nGaeilge.

Charles O’Donnell

16 May 2024
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOX
Financial Stability Review Issue 1, 2024
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Abstract
Recent stress episodes have shown how leverage in the non-bank financial intermediation (NBFI) sector can be a source of systemic risk and amplify stress in the wider financial system. Prominent examples of leverage-related risk in the NBFI sector include the role of leveraged hedge funds in the US Treasury market in March 2020, liability-driven investment funds in UK gilt markets in September 2022 and the failure of Archegos Capital Management in March 2021. In response to these events, policymakers around the world have launched a range of initiatives to contain risks from leverage in the NBFI sector more broadly. A key takeaway from these recent experiences and policy initiatives is that no single tool can be uniformly applied to address risks stemming from NBFI leverage. An effective policy response requires a broad range of tools to be made available, which should be appropriately tailored to the specific circumstances and can serve as complements to each other. Given the significant cross-border and cross-sector dimension of these risks, close coordination and cooperation between various authorities is essential, ensuring that risks are addressed from a system-wide perspective.
JEL Code
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
27 February 2024
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 342
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Abstract
The introduction of the Securities Financing Transactions Regulation into EU law provides a unique opportunity to obtain an in-depth understanding of repo markets. Based on the transaction-level data reported under the regulation, this paper presents an overview and key facts about the euro area repo market. We start by providing a description of the dataset, including its regulatory background, as well as highlighting some of its advantages for financial stability analysis. We then go on to present three sets of findings that are highly relevant to financial stability and focus on the dimensions of the different market segments, counterparties, and collateral, including haircut practices. Finally, we outline how the data reported under the regulation can support the policy work of central banks and supervisory authorities. We demonstrate that these data can be used to make several important contributions to enhancing our understanding of the repo market from a financial stability perspective, ultimately assisting international efforts to increase repo market resilience.
JEL Code
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
31 May 2023
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOX
Financial Stability Review Issue 1, 2023
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Abstract
Recent stress episodes have shown how non-bank financial institutions can amplify stress in the wider financial system when faced with sudden increases in margin and collateral calls. The resulting spikes in the demand for liquidity and/or deleveraging can lead to disorderly asset sales or large cash withdrawals, from money market funds for instance, with spillovers to other financial institutions or markets. In several cases, extraordinary policy responses by public authorities and central banks helped to stabilise markets and limit contagion. This box examines two of the key vulnerabilities – excessive leverage and inadequate liquidity preparedness to meet margin and collateral calls – and discusses policy implications for enhancing the resilience of the non-bank financial sector.
JEL Code
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G18 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Government Policy and Regulation
G22 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Insurance, Insurance Companies, Actuarial Studies
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
21 January 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - FOCUS - No. 16
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Abstract
This impact assessment shows that a mandatory public debt holding would reduce the liquidity risk of private debt money market funds by increasing their shock absorption capacity and diversifying their asset liquidity profile. This would enable these funds to better mitigate the externalities associated with large-scale redemptions. The analysis also considers possible costs related to the funding of non-financial corporations and the attractiveness of MMFs as well as possible feasibility issues in terms of the supply of public debt.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
21 January 2022
MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 16
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Abstract
This article assesses proposed reforms to the European Money Market Funds (MMF) Regulation to enhance the resilience of the sector. Specifically, the article provides a rationale for requiring private debt MMFs to hold higher levels of liquid assets, of which a part should be public debt, and considers the design and calibration of such a requirement. The article also proposes that the impediments to the use of liquidity buffers should be removed and authorities should have a role in releasing these buffers. Finally, while the removal of a stable net asset value for low-volatility MMFs would reduce cliff effects, we argue that this might not be necessary if liquidity requirements for these private debt MMFs are sufficiently strengthened.
JEL Code
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
17 November 2021
FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - BOX
Financial Stability Review Issue 2, 2021
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Abstract
This box establishes stylised facts about the significant increase in initial margin (IM) in the euro area derivatives market during the March 2020 market turmoil. First, it shows that the increase was concentrated almost entirely in centrally cleared derivatives and driven mainly by equity, credit and interest rate portfolios. Second, by comparing static portfolios with those where portfolio repositioning took place, the IM increase is decomposed into (i) changes attributable to the CCP model sensitivity to market volatility, and (ii) changes attributable to portfolio repositioning by investors. For centrally cleared interest rate and credit derivatives (where this method is applicable), CCP model sensitivity to market volatility is found to be a key driver of the IM increase. Overall, the results suggest that it is important to develop a clearer understanding of “excessive procyclicality” for IM and possibly, on the basis of this common understanding, to review the models which CCPs use to calibrate IMs. The supervisory and regulatory framework governing the liquidity management of market participants, and in particular that of some non-bank financial intermediaries, should also be strengthened.
JEL Code
C60 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling→General
G10 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→General
G13 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Contingent Pricing, Futures Pricing
22 January 2021
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 254
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Abstract
The cost of equity for banks equates to the compensation that market participants demand for investing in and holding banks’ equity, and has important implications for the transmission of monetary policy and for financial stability. Notwithstanding its importance, the cost of equity is unobservable and therefore needs to be estimated. This occasional paper provides estimates of the cost of equity for listed and unlisted euro area banks using a three-step methodology. In the first step, ten different models are estimated. In the second step, the models’ results are combined applying an equal-weighting procedure. In the third step, the combined costs of equity for individual banks are aggregated at the euro area level and according to banks’ business models. The results suggest that, since the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-08, the premia that investors demand to compensate them for the risk they bear when financing banks’ equity has been persistently higher than the return on equity (ROE) generated by banks. We show that our estimates of cost of equity have plausible relationships to banks’ fundamentals. The cost of equity tends to be higher for banks that are riskier (higher non-performing loan ratios), less efficient (higher cost-to-income ratio), and with more unstable funding sources (higher relative reliance on interbank deposits). Finally, we use bank fundamentals to estimate the cost of equity for unlisted banks. In general, unlisted banks are found to have a somewhat lower cost of equity compared to listed banks, with business model characteristics accounting for part of the estimated difference.
JEL Code
G20 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→General
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G1 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets